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This paper discusses the link between patterns of technological change and economic 
development taking an evolutionary perspective. We argue that the modes and timing of 
such coupled dynamics are deeply influenced by the emergence of new techno-economic 
paradigms or regimes. ICT-based technologies are the drivers of the current paradigm, 
which, we show, is still at an early stage of diffusion, particularly for developing countries. 
Building  from  historical  evidence,  we  argue  that  catching  up  of  developing  countries 
critically depends on their ability to master the technology behind the dominant techno-
economic paradigm. We then discuss threats and opportunities related to a possible ICT-
based development path. 
 




The  original  mandate  of  this  contribution  was:  from  a  broadly  defined  evolutionary 
perspective,  what  are  the  likely  effects  of  the  current  ``ICT  revolution"  upon  growth  in 
general and development opportunities and constraints in particular? Reflecting on that, 
we  deemed  useful  to  move  some  steps  backward  in  order  to  even  try  to  give  some 
impressionistic hints on possible answers. Hence in the following we start by addressing 
two broad preliminary questions, namely: 
First, what is the distinctive "evolutionary" interpretation of the processes of innovation and 
technological diffusion in their relation to economic growth? And second, what are the 
historical  patterns  of  technological  change  and  their  apparent  relations  with  economic 
growth? 
Only after having set such background, we shall move to the original question and offer 
some  pieces  of  evidence  and  conjectures  on  the  properties  of  a  possible  ICT-driven 
growth regime, and its implications for development. 
 
                                                 
1 This paper draws upon Cimoli and Dosi (1995) and Castaldi, Cimoli, Correa and Dosi (2004). The 




2  A  telegraphic  summary  of  the  results  stemming  from  the 
efforts  aimed  at  opening  up  the  ``black box"  of  technological 
activities 
 
A  good  deal  of  evolutionary  inspired  literature  on  the  economics  of  innovation  and 
technical change has indeed advanced a lot in recent years our understanding of what one 
finds inside the `black box of technology' (``Inside the black box" is also the title of the 
influential  book  of  one  of  the  pioneers  of  the  emerging  discipline  of  the  economics  of 
innovation and technological change, Nathan Rosenberg (Rosenberg (1982)). What does 
one find inside such a black box? 
 
2.1 The properties of technological learning 
 
Telegraphically, one finds quite well structured bodies of knowledge which elsewhere one 
of us has called technological paradigms. As discussed at greater length in Dosi (1982), 
Dosi  (1988)  and  Dosi,  Orsenigo  and  Sylos  Labini  (2005),  each  paradigm  involves 
knowledge bases grounded in selected physical/chemical principles and entails equally 
specific patterns of solution of selected techno-economic problems and rules aimed at the 
refinement  and  accumulation  of  new  knowledge.  Examples  of  technological  paradigms 
include the internal combustion engine, oil-based synthetic chemistry and semiconductor- 
based  micro-electronics,  among  many  others.  In  fact,  a  closer  look  at  the  patterns  of 
technical change suggests the existence of ``paradigms" with different levels of generality 
in most industrial activities. 
In turn, the progressive realization of the opportunities of product and process innovation 
associated with each paradigm tends to proceed along relatively ordered technological 
trajectories. Let us recall some properties of such trajectories which will become useful in 
the remainder of the essay. 
First, each particular body of knowledge (i.e. each paradigm) shapes and constrains the 
rates and direction of technological change irrespectively of market inducements (including 
fine variations in demand patterns and relative prices. 
Second, as a consequence, one should be able to observe regularities and invariances in 
the patterns of technical change which hold under different market conditions (e.g. under 
different  relative  prices)  and  whose  disruption  is  associated  with  radical  changes  in 
knowledge bases (that is, in paradigms). 
Third, technical change is partly driven by repeated attempts to cope with technological 
imbalances which it itself creates. 
A  general  property,  by  now  widely  acknowledged  in  the  innovation  literature,  is  that 
learning is local and cumulative. Local means that the exploration and development of new 
techniques  is  likely  to  occur  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  techniques  already  in  use. 
Cumulative  means  that  current  technological  developments  -  at  least  at  the  level  of 
individual business units - often build upon past experiences of production and innovation, 
and  it  proceeds  via  sequences  of  specific  problem-solving  junctures  (Vincenti  (1990)). 
Clearly, this goes very well together with the ideas of paradigmatic knowledge and the 
ensuing trajectories. A crucial implication, however, is that at any point in time the agents 
involved in a particular production activity will face relatively little scope for substitution 
among techniques, if by that we mean the easy availability of blueprints different from 
those actually in use, which could be put efficiently into operation according to relative 
input  prices  (on  the  contrary  attempts  at  inter-factoral  substitution  are  in  fact 
indistinguishable from efforts to innovate). 
A paradigm-based theory of technology and of production yields the following predictions: 3 
a) In general, there is at any point in time one or very few best practice techniques which 
dominate the others irrespectively of relative prices. 
b) Different agents are characterized by persistently diverse (better and worse) techniques 
and products. 
c) Over time the observed aggregate dynamics of technical coefficients in each particular 
activity is the joint outcome of the process of imitation/diffusion of existing best-practice 
techniques, of the search for new ones, and of market selection amongst heterogeneous 
agents. 
Together, note that in the evolutionary view of economic change firms are crucial, although 
not  exclusive,  repositories  of  knowledge,  embedded  in  operational  routines  and 
organizational  capabilities  (in  fact  a  whole  field  of  literature  has  opened  up  under  this 
heading).  Hence,  technical  change  and  organizational  change  are  highly  intertwined: 
technologies and organizational structures and behaviours tend to co-evolve. 
A great deal of the evolutionary interpretation of technological change also acknowledges 
that micro-processes of technological and organizational change are embedded in broader 
institutional  frameworks  at  the  national  and/or  the  regional  level.  In  the  historical 
interpretation  of  Freeman  (1995),  national  institutions  have  powerfully  influenced  the 
relative  rates  of  technological  change  of  different  countries.  The  notion  of  ‘national 
systems of innovation’ has captured the importance of the national institutional context 
motivating economic actors and shaping incentives for innovation (Lundvall, 1992, Nelson 
1993).  Technological  learning  is  very  much  an  ‘interactive’  process  where  relations 
between  different  participants  to  the  innovation  process  (suppliers,  producers,  users, 
universities) may be affected by existing institutional structures. The related literature has 
also  crucially  stressed  the  continuing  institutional  variety  of  countries,  with  different 
national institutional settings and policies co-existing worldwide. At the regional level, the 
local nature of technological learning implies that the innovative performance of a region 
will be highly influenced by the characteristics of local networks of production in terms of, 
for instance, the extent of knowledge externalities and the level of mutual trust. In line with 
the  claims  in  Freeman  (1995),  we  will  also  argue  at  different  points  in  this  paper  that 
national  systems  of  innovation  and  production  become  even  more  important  in  a 
globalized  world  where  countries  wish  to  become  attractive  locations  within  global 
networks of trade and production. 
 
 
2.2  The  evolutionary  path  of  technological  learning  in  economic 
development 
 
Given the evolutionary representation of technological learning sketched in the previous 
section, what are the implications in terms of the international distribution of technological 
capabilities and of patterns of economic development? (see Cimoli and Dosi (1995) for a 
broader discussion). 
First,  evolutionary  interpretations  are  comfortable  with  the  observation  of  persistent 
asymmetries among countries in the production processes which they are able to master 
(this of course also shows up in terms of different inputs efficiencies: see Dosi, Pavitt and 
Soete (1990)). Thus, one can draw two major testable conjectures: (i) different countries 
might  well  be  unequivocally  ranked  according  to  the  efficiencies  of  their  average 
techniques of production and, in the product space, of the (price-weighted) performance 
characteristics of their outputs, irrespectively of relative prices, and (ii) the absence of any 
significant  relationship  between  these  gaps  and  international  differences  in  the 
capital/output  ratios.  Wide  differences  apply  also  to  the  capabilities  of  developing  new 
products and to different time lags in producing them after they have been introduced into 
the  world  economy.  Indeed,  the  international  distribution  of  innovative  capabilities 
regarding new products is at least as uneven as that regarding production processes. 4 
Second, the process of development and industrialization are strictly linked to the inter- 
and intra-national diffusion of "superior" techniques. Relatedly, as already mentioned, at 
any  point  in  time,  there  is  likely  to  be  only  one  or,  at  most,  very  few  "best  practice" 
techniques of production which correspond to the technological frontier. In the case of 
developing  economies,  the  process  of  industrialization  is  thus  closely  linked  with  the 
borrowing, imitation, and adaptation of established technologies and, together, with the 
adoption and diffusion of novel organizational forms from more advanced economies. This 
process of adoption and adaptation of technologies, in turn, are influenced by the specific 
capabilities of each economy. In this context, we suggest that evolutionary micro-theories 
are  well  apt  to  account  for  the  processes  by  which  technological  gaps  and  national 
institutional diversities can jointly reproduce themselves over rather long spans of time. 
Conversely, in other circumstances, it might be precisely this institutional and technological 
diversity  among  countries  which  may  foster  catching-up  (and,  rarely  leapfrogging)  in 
innovative capabilities and the per capita incomes. 
To repeat, evolutionary theories are well in tune with predictions of persistent technological 
gaps across firms and across countries, and equally persistent income gaps. But what is 
the secular evidence in this respect? 
 
3  The  long-term  distribution  of  innovative/imitative  search  for 
new technologies and its relationship with economic growth 
 
The basic phenomenon to start from is indeed the highly skewed international distribution 
of innovative activities which has emerged since the Industrial Revolution (Dosi, Pavitt and 
Soete  (1990))  starting  from  previously  rather  homogenous  conditions  at  least  between 
Europe, China and the Arab World (Cipolla (1965)). It is certainly true that technological 
“innovativeness" is hard to measure, but irrespectively of the chosen proxy, the picture 
which emerges is one with innovative activities highly concentrated in a small group of 
countries. An illustration using patents registered in the US is presented in Table 1. 
Indeed, the club of major innovators has been quite small over the whole period of around 
two centuries and half since British industrialization, with both restricted entry (with Japan 
as the only major entrant in the 20th century, and Korea and Taiwan as recent additions) 
and a slow pace of change in relative rankings.  
At the same time, since the Industrial Revolution, one observes the explosion of diverging 
income patterns, starting from quite similar pre-industrial per capita level. Table 2 presents 
estimates  showing  that  before  the  Industrial  Revolution  the  income  gap  between  the 
poorest and the richest region was probably of the order of only 1 to 2. Conversely, the 
dominant tendency after the Industrial Revolution is one with fast increasing differentiation 
among countries and overall divergence. Even in the Post World War II period, commonly 
regarded as an era of growing uniformity, the hypothesis of global convergence, that is 
convergence  of  the  whole  population  of  countries  toward  increasingly  similar  income 
levels, does not find support from the evidence (DeLong (1988), Easterly et al. (1992), 
Verspagen  (1991),  Soete  and  Verspagen  (1993),  Durlauf  and  Johnson  (1992),  Quah 
(1996) and Castaldi and Dosi (2007), among others). Moreover, the process of divergence 
in incomes has speeded up over time. Clark and Feenstra (2003) claim that: ``Per capita 
incomes across the world seemingly diverged by much more in 1910 than in 1800, and 
more in 1990 than 1910 - this despite the voluminous literature on exogenous growth that 
has  stressed  the  convergence  of  economies,  or,  to  be  more  precise,  ``conditional" 
convergence." (op. cit., p. 277). 
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Table 1: US patents granted, by country of applicant and year (% of non-US 
recipients) 
 
  1883  1900  1929  1958  1973  1986  1995  2004 
OECD               Australia  1.11  2.33  1.96  0.60  0.89  1.14  1.00  1.19 
Austria  2.62  3.36  2.47  1.12  1.05  1.09  0.74  0.67 
Belgium  1.59  1.35  1.30  1.14  1.25  0.74  0.87  0.76 
Canada  19.94  10.54  10.25  7.99  5.95  4.01  4.61  4.22 
Denmark  0.56  0.46  0.71  0.74  0.68  0.56  0.44  0.52 
France  14.22  9.79  9.76  10.36  9.47  7.24  6.18  4.22 
Germany  18.67  30.72  32.36  25.60  24.68  20.94  14.45  13.47 
Italy  0.24  0.92  1.19  3.02  3.35  3.04  2.36  1.98 
Japan  0.16  0.03  1.40  1.93  21.82  40.35  47.64  44.18 
Netherlands  0.24  0.75  1.57  5.71  3.03  2.21  1.75  1.59 
Norway  0.32  0.49  0.71  0.61  0.37  0.25  0.28  0.30 
Sweden  0.95  1.32  3.19  4.64  3.37  2.70  1.76  1.61 
Switzerland  1.75  2.27  4.46  8.80  5.86  3.70  2.31  1.60 
UK  34.55  30.52  22.23  23.45  12.61  7.35  5.43  4.31 
                 
NICs               Israel          0.37  0.58  0.84  1.28 
Singapore          0.03  0.01  0.12  0.56 
Taiwan          0.00  0.64  3.55  7.42 
South Korea          0.02  0.14  2.54  5.53 
Hong Kong          0.07  0.09  0.19  0.39 
                 
India          0.09  0.05  0.08  0.45 
China          0.04  0.03  0.14  0.50 
                 
Latin America  Argentina          0.12  0.05  0.07  0.06 
Brazil          0.08  0.08  0.14  0.13 
Mexico          0.19  0.11  0.09  0.11 
Venezuela          0.03  0.06  0.06  0.02 
Source: elaborations on US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 6 
Table 2: Estimates of trends in World income: per capita GDP of regions relative to 
the US and Western Offshoots 
   
               
Regions 
  1700  1820  1870  1913  1950  1973  2001 
 
Western Europe  210  100  81  66  49  71  71 
Eastern Europe  127  57  39  32  23  31  22 
Former USSR  128  57  39  28  31  37  17 
US and Western Offshoots  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Latin America  111  58  28  28  27  28  22 
Japan  120  56  30  27  21  71  77 
Asia (excl Japan)  120  48  23  13  7  8  12 
Africa  88  35  21  12  10  9  6 
World  129  55  36  29  23  25  22 
               
Source: Own elaborations on per capita GDP,1990 million international dollars, 1700-2001 from 
Maddison (2001). 
Western Offshoots: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States 
 
Indeed, one finds some, although not overwhelming, evidence of local convergence, i.e. 
convergence within subsets of countries grouped according to some initial characteristics 
such as income levels (Durlauf and Johnson (1992)) or geographical locations. The typical 
patterns  are  impressionistically  illustrated  in  Figure  1  from  Durlauf  and  Quah  (1998), 
showing the appearance of a two-humped distribution of countries with low (albeit positive) 
transition probabilities between the `poor' and `rich' clubs (and vice versa, too). 
 
Figure 1: Evolving cross-country income distributions (Durlauf and Quah (1998)) 
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Bimodality hints at a separating tendency between poor and rich countries, characterized 
by  markedly  different  income  levels.  At  the  same  time,  the  other  part  of  the  story,  as 
discussed at length in Quah (1997), is that the same shape of a given distribution may 
conceal very different intra-distribution dynamics. Is it the case that poor countries have 
been converging to a common income level and rich countries to their own high level of 
income or the two modes are also the result of shifting in ranking between poor and rich 
countries?  The  issue  at  stake  is  the  respective  weight  of  persistence  and  mobility  of 
countries inside the distribution. Quah (1997) finds evidence that the period 1960-1988 
has been characterized by high persistence of relative rankings,  notwithstanding some 
important  exceptions.  The  main  events  contributing  to  mobility  have  been  the  `growth 
miracles' of countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Korea and Taiwan and `growth 
disasters' including some sub-Saharan African countries, but also Venezuela which was 
the  among  the  first  richest  countries  in  1960  and  has  dramatically  fallen  in  the  `poor' 
countries club. 
Recent  evidence  on  the  world  income  distribution  has  shown  that  population-weighted 
measures of inequality have decreased in the last two decades, mainly due to China and 
India (see the discussion in Bourguignon et al (2004)). While the finding provides indeed 
evidence  for  the  convergence  hypothesis,  it  does  not  shed  light  on  the  increasingly 
frequent  episodes  of `marginalization'  (cf. Melchior  and Telle  (2001)).  Authors  such  as 
Dowrick and DeLong (2003) agree on the convergence of OECD economies and also 
within a broader group including the East Asian economies, and with China and India too 
after 1980. ``However, these episodes of successful economic growth and convergence 
have been counterbalanced by many economies' loss of their membership in the world's 
convergence club." (op. cit., p. 193). 
At the same time, across-group differences in growth performances appear to be rather 
persistent. Likewise, one observes persistently wide and in some cases widening (such as 
in a few Latin American cases) productivity gaps vis-a’-vis the international frontier (cf. 
Table 3 for estimates of labor productivity relative to the US). As discussed also in van Ark 
and  McGuckin  (1999)  all  available  evidence  witnesses  a  persistent  dispersion  in 
productivity measures. More specifically, while countries in the OECD area appeared to 
have moved on average closer to the US benchmark, the same cannot be said for the rest 
of the world. 
A delicate but crucial issue concerns the relation between patterns of technical change 
and patterns of economic growth. Of course, technological learning involves many more 
elements than simply inventive discovery and patenting. Equally important activities are 
imitation, reverse engineering, and adoption of capital-embodied innovations, learning by 
doing  and  learning  by  using  (Freeman  (1982),  Dosi  (1988),  Patel  and  Pavitt  (1994)). 
Moreover, technological change goes often together with organizational innovation. Still, it 
is  important  to  notice  the  existence  of  significant  links  between  innovative  activities 
(measured in a rather narrow sense, i.e. in terms of patenting and R&D activities) and 
GDP per capita (for the time being, we shall avoid any detailed argument on the direction 
of causality), which however tend to change over different historical periods. 
As discussed in Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani (1994), evidence concerning OECD countries 
appears to suggest that the relationship between innovative activities and levels of GDP 
has become closer over time and is highly significant after World War II (see Table 4). 
Moreover,  innovative  dynamism,  measured  by  the  growth  of  patenting  by  different 
countries in the US, always appears positively correlated with per capita GDP growth, 
even if the relation is quite noisy and period-specific (see results from Tables 5 and 6)
2. 
                                                 
2 Tables 4  and 5  are based on Pavitt  and Soete (1981) for the  years until 1977. Their  original sample 
included 14 OECD countries. Results for most recent years in Tables 4 and 6 are obtained for an updated 
sample of 21 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Korea,  Mexico,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom). Our elaborations are based on data from OECD (real GDP, population 
and R&D spending in the business sector) and USPTO (historical series of granted patents). 8 
The link is particularly robust between 1913 and 1970. Conversely, a sign that the regime 
of international growth might have changed in the 1970s, is that in this period the relation 
gets weaker and loses statistical significance. The link becomes again strong in the 1980s, 
loses significance again in the 1990s, and regains it in the most recent period: in our view, 
this  is  circumstantial  evidence  of  a  turbulent  and  uncertain  dynamics  in  the  “political 
economies" of different countries governing the coupled dynamics between technological 
learning, demand generation and growth. 
In general, at least since World War II, the rates of growth of GDP appear to be closely 
correlated  with:  (i)  domestic  innovative  activities,  (ii)  the  rates  of  investment  in  capital 
equipment  and  (iii)  international  technological  diffusion  (DeLong  (1988),  Soete  and 
Verspagen  (1993),  Meliciani  (2001),  Laursen  (2000),  among  others).  In  particular 
Fagerberg (1988) finds a close correlation between the level of ‘economic development', in 
terms of per capita GDP, and the level of ‘technological development', measured with the 
R&D  investment  level  or  with  patenting  activity.
3
  There  is  no  strong  evidence  of 
convergence of innovative capabilities (PT and pt indicators in tables 5 and 6), but there is 
some continuing sign of convergence in income. 
In  turn,  capability  of  innovating  and  quickly  adopting  new  technologies  is  strongly 
correlated with successful trade performance (Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990)). 
Moreover, despite technological diffusion taking place at rather high rates, at least among 
OECD countries, important specificities in “national innovation systems" persist, related to 
the  characteristics  of  the  scientific  and  technical  infrastructure,  local  user-producer 
relationship and other institutional and policy features of each country (Lundvall (1992), 
Nelson  (1993),  Archibugi,  Howells  and  Michie  (2001)).  In  an  historical  perspective, 
Freeman (2002) convincingly argues how catch-up of countries has critically relied on the 
ability to build successful national innovation systems. This has been, in turn, the case for 
England, US, Japan and, most recently, the Asian tigers. 
To repeat, the dominant tendency throughout the foregoing secular picture hints at long-
term divergence in relative technological capabilities, production efficiencies and incomes. 
Together come however two more hopeful messages. 
First,  notwithstanding  prominently  divergent  patterns, one has also  witnessed  secularly 
increasing average levels of technological knowledge within most countries, and together 
also in the levels of per capita income. Second, while it holds true that the ``innovators 
club" has been remarkably small and sticky in its membership, one ought to notice both 
the  possibility  of  entry  by  a  few  successful  latecomers  (in  different  periods,  the  US, 
Germany and Japan being the most striking examples) and also the possibility of falling 
behind by very promising candidates to the club (cf. the vicissitudes of Argentina over the 
last  century).  But  what  about  the  long-term  time-profile  of  technological  change  and 
economic growth?  Can one identify some persistent features in the ways technologies 




                                                                                                                                                                  
 
3 His sample includes most world economies and covers the years 1960-1982. 
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  1870  1913  1950  1973  1990  1998  2004 
OECD             Austria  60.6  56.4  31.4  61.4  75.5  76.4  75.2 
Australia  153.2  106.4  74.2  71.7  75.7  81.1  77.3 
Belgium  96.1  71.9  58.2  75.5  91.3  89.6  85.3 
Canada  75.7  86.9  85.1  85.8  82.9  80.9  76.7 
Denmark  69.0  68.6  59.6  66.5  73.3  76.1  73.0 
Finland  38.1  36.2  34.1  53.5  69.4  75.9  74.0 
France  60.6  56.0  46.3  76.4  92.0  90.7  85.5 
Germany  66.0  58.7  42.9  72.2  71.1  73.7  70.6 
Ireland      35.0  47.9  73.9  82.3  87.6 
Italy  45.4  40.6  40.8  69.5  83.9  82.7  72.5 
Japan  20.3  20.9  18.7  56.9  76.1  71.8  69.2 
Netherlands  107.8  80.4  67.1  82.4  82.8  76.8  68.7 
Norway  52.7  46.7  51.8  63.9  78.1  84.7  83.7 
Spain    45.0  22.2  50.0  75.5  73.6  62.4 
Sweden  53.9  50.2  57.4  68.2  68.7  75.2  74.1 
Switzerland  68.3  65.0  75.5  82.4  75.2  69.4  63.5 
UK  113.9  84.8  65.2  65.6  72.4  75.4  73.6 
US  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
               
Latin America  Argentina      52.4  52.9  35.9  45.2  35.5 
Brazil      23.0  27.9  26.0  27.0  24.1 
Chile      48.2  40.3  38.9  47.6  44.6 
Colombia      28.5  29.3  28.5  27.5  23.8 
Mexico      34.1  45.9  36.1  31.7  29.0 
Peru      27.5  31.2  17.6  17.8  16.5 
Venezuela      97.7  92.4  53.4  46.0  37.2 
               
NICs                 Israel        61.2  65.3  64.9  55.2 
Hong Kong      87.0  43.3  75.4  78.3  85.3 
Singapore        39.5  57.7  74.5  77.4 
Korea      10.7  21.3  42.3  51.0  56.5 
Taiwan      10.9  28.7  49.6  64.2  66.5 
               
India      5.8  6.1  7.1  8.6  9.5 
China      5.5  4.8  6.7  9.3  13.0 
Source: Total Economy Database, GGDC (2006), historical values (in italics) are from Maddison (2001).10 
 
7 ΕΟΗ     &ΡΥΥΗΟ  ΛΡΘ ΦΡΗΙΙΛΦΛΗΘ ς ΕΗ ΖΗΗΘ ΟΗΨΗΟς ΡΙ ,ΘΘΡΨ  ΛΨΗ 
∃Φ ΛΨΛ ∴  ΘΓ ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ    2(&∋ ΦΡΞΘ ΥΛΗς 
  Correlation of GPD per capita with 
Year  US patents per capita  R&D per capita 
1890  0.20   
1913  0.38   
1329  0.56*   
1950  0.63*   
1963  0.73**  0.79** 
1967  0.72**  0.69** 
1971  0.74**  0.71** 
1977  0.88**  0.61** 
1981  0.65**  0.62** 
1985  0.61**  0.49* 
1991  0.63**  0.68** 
1996  0.50*  0.62** 
2003  0.35  0.36 
 
* Significance at 5% level  
** Significance at 1% level * 
Source:   Pavitt and Soete (1981) until 1977 and own elaborations for later years11 
7 ΕΟΗ     &ΡΥΥΗΟ  ΛΡΘ ΦΡΗΙΙΛΦΛΗΘ  ΕΗ ΖΗΗΘ ,ΘΘΡΨ  ΛΨΗ ∃Φ ΛΨΛ ∴  ΘΓ 
2Ξ ΣΞ                 2(&∋ ΦΡΞΘ ΥΛΗς 
 
 
        ∗∋3 ∗∋3 ∗∋3 ∗∋3        ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ    ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ    ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ    ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ          
        86 Σ  ΗΘ ς ΣΗΥ 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς ΣΗΥ 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς ΣΗΥ 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς ΣΗΥ        86  86  86  86 
Σ  ΗΘ ς Σ  ΗΘ ς Σ  ΗΘ ς Σ  ΗΘ ς       
∗∋3 ΣΗΥ  ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ  ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ  ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ 
Φ ΣΛ   Φ ΣΛ   Φ ΣΛ   Φ ΣΛ         
        ∗ΥΡΖ Κ ∗ΥΡΖ Κ ∗ΥΡΖ Κ ∗ΥΡΖ Κ       
       
          ϑΥΡΖ Κ           ϑΥΡΖ Κ           ϑΥΡΖ Κ           ϑΥΡΖ Κ        Φ ΣΛ           Φ ΣΛ           Φ ΣΛ           Φ ΣΛ          
                                      
ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ    ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ    ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ    ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   
ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ       
                                  
         ϑ   ϑ   ϑ   ϑ          ∴   ∴   ∴   ∴          37   37   37   37          Σ    Σ    Σ    Σ           <   <   <   <        
               
                                       
1890-1913           
g  1.00  0.60*  0.60*  -0.22  -0.18 
y    1.00  0.20  0.05  -0.66** 
PT      1.00  -0.61*  0.22 
pt        1.00  -.67** 
Y          1.00 
1913-1929           
g  1.00  0.76**  -0.12  0.66**  -0.41 
y    1.00  -1.21  0.67**  -0.62* 
PT      1.00  -0.55*  0.38 
pt        1.00  -0.43 
Y          1.00 
1929-1950           
g  1.00  0.82**  0.31  0.66**  0.37 
y    1.00  0.41  0.58*  0.40 
PT      1.00  0.22  0.56* 
pt        1.00  0.67** 
Y          1.00 
1950-1970           
g  1.00  0.75**  0.38  0.89**  -0.76** 
y    1.00  0.40  0.71*  -0.76* 
PT      1.00  -0.48  0.63* 
pt        1.00  -0.84* 
Y          1.00 
1970-1977           
g  1.00  0.91**  -0.67**  0.29  -0.47 
y    1.00  -0.60*  0.16  -0.48 
PT      1.00  -0.28  0.66** 
pt        1.00  -0.16 
Y          1.00 
           
* Significance at 5% level  
** Significance at 1% level  
Source:   Pavitt and Soete (1981)12 
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2Ξ ΣΞ                 2(&∋ ΦΡΞΘ ΥΛΗς  
 
 
        ∗∋3 ∗∋3 ∗∋3 ∗∋3        ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ          86 Σ  ΗΘ ς 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς        86 Σ  ΗΘ ς 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς 86 Σ  ΗΘ ς        ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ∗∋3 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ         
        ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ        ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ ϑΥΡΖ Κ        ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ          ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ          ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ          ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ                 ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ϑΥΡΖ Κ ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ϑΥΡΖ Κ ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ϑΥΡΖ Κ ΣΗΥ Φ ΣΛ   ϑΥΡΖ Κ                                          
         ϑ   ϑ   ϑ   ϑ          ∴   ∴   ∴   ∴          37   37   37   37          Σ    Σ    Σ    Σ           <  <  <  <              
                                                                                  
1970-1977           
g  1.00  0.88**  -0.60**  0.37  -0.87** 
y    1.00  -0.49  0.18  -0.70** 
PT      1.00  -0.21  0.73** 
pt        1.00  -0.14 
Y          1.00 
1977-1984           
g  1.00  0.88**  -0.36  0.78**  -0.76** 
y    1.00  -0.25  0.82**  -0.54* 
PT      1.00  -0.26  0.64** 
pt        1.00  -0.63** 
Y          1.00 
1984-1991           
g  1.00  0.96**  -0.15  0.94**  0.94** 
y    1.00  -0.13  0.89**  -0.49* 
PT      1.00  -0.24  0.61** 
pt        1.00  -0.58** 
Y          1.00 
1991-1998           
g  1.00  0.96**  -0.48*  0.37  -0.34 
y    1.00  -0.46*  0.30  -0.25 
PT      1.00  -0.27  0.63** 
pt        1.00  -0.39 
Y          1.00 
1998-2003           
g  1.00  0.96**  -0.45*  0.52*  -0.44* 
y    1.00  -0.40  0.51*  -0.46* 
PT      1.00  -0.30  0.42* 
pt        1.00  -0.17 
Y          1.00 
 
* Significance at 5% level 
** Significance at 1% level 
Source: Own elaborations on data from OECD and USPTO for a sample of 21 OECD 
countries13 
 
4 Distinct "regimes" of growth/development with distinct techno-
economic paradigms and complementary organizational forms and 
institutions 
 
In  order  to  understand  the  evolution  of  the  relation  between  technological  change  and 
economic development, it is useful to turn to the notion of “techno-economic paradigm” or 
“regime” (Freeman and Perez (1988))
4.  One of the very first definitions can be found in Perez 
(1985), p.443: 
 
``We suggest that the behavior of the relative cost structure of all inputs to production follows 
more  or  less  predictable  trends  for  relatively  long  periods.  This  predictability  becomes  the 
basis  for  the  construction  of  an  'ideal  type'  of  producing  organization,  which  defines  the 
contours of the most efficient and "least cost" combinations for a given period. It thus serves 
as a general "rule-of-thumb" guide for investment and technological decisions. That general 
guiding model is the ``techno-economic paradigm’’.’’  
 
Figure 2:  Five successive technological revolutions, 1770 to 2000s  
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Each techno-economic paradigm relies on the availability of a specific key factor that presents 
a set of characteristics: 
 
``The focusing device or main organizing principle of this selective mechanism would be a 
particular input or set of inputs, capable of strongly influencing the behavior of the relative cost 
                                                 
4 Note that the notion of “techno-economic paradigm” is essentially a macro notion, while the “paradigms” 
discussed in Section 2 address the features of individual technologies.  In fact, the two notions are highly 
complementary, with the former being composed of interrelated constellations of the latter. 14 
structure. Such an input, which we shall call the `key factor', is capable of playing a steering 
role because it fulfills the following conditions: 
(1) clearly perceived low -- and descending -- relative cost, 
(2) apparently unlimited supply (for all practical purposes), 
(3) obvious potential for all-pervasive influence in the productive sphere, and 
(4) a generally recognized capacity, based on a set of interwoven technical and organizational 
innovations,  to  reduce  the  costs  and  change  the  quality  of  capital  equipment,  labor  and 
products.” (op.cit. p. 444) 
 
 
The work by Perez (2002) has identified five main technological revolutions in the time span 
from 1770 to 2000 (Table 2) and five corresponding techno-economic paradigms (Table 3). 
For each of them there is a clear `key factor’. Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of the 
underlying industries and infrastructures of the different techno-economic regimes.  
 
There is little doubt in our view that one can talk about a new, ICT-based, techno-economic 
regime.  ICT’s  share  with  previous  regimes  some  distinctive  features.  First,  the  new 
technologies are pervasive, with a range of applications spanning all industries. Second, the 
new regime relies on a quasi-free crucial input: yesterday energy/electricity, today it is clearly 
computer  power.  Third,  the  establishment  of  the  new  regime  entails  painstaking  ``co-
evolutionary" requirements between technological and organizational changes, which we will 
discuss at length in the next section and for which  we  will provide evidence in Section 6. 
Fourth, the initial phase of the new regime is characterized by bubble dynamics in the ‘core 
economies’  developing  them.  The  recent  new  economy  bubble  following  the  widespread 
euphoria of the 1990s bears strong similarities with the panic and euphoria dynamics of the 
automobile boom in the US in the 1920s, as vividly recalled by Freeman (2001).  
 
At the same time, one should also bear in mind that the emergence of an ICT based techno-
economic  paradigm  is  occurring  within  a  regime  of  globalization  of  international  economic 
exchanges, but not of globalization of technological capabilities (as we will argue at greater 
length in Section 7) so far. Not only are the capabilities of mastering new technologies deeply 
unevenly distributed across countries but even within technological leaders one is still in a 
phase of exploration of the possible application of ICT-based technologies. 
 
 
5. The painstaking diffusion of the new regime 
 
The evidence in our view largely supports the view that the `ICT revolution' is far from having 
expressed its full potential yet. `Technological revolutions' display long diffusion processes, 
because they entail co-evolution and co-adaptation of new technologies, new organizational 
forms, new institutions, and new consumption patterns: 
 
``The  eventual  supplanting  of  an  entrenched  techno-economic  regime  involves  profound  changes 
whose revolutionary nature is better revealed by their eventual breadth and depth of the clusters of 
innovation that emerge than by the pace at which they achieve their influence. Exactly because of the 
breadth  and  depth  of  the  changes  entailed,  successful  elaboration  of  a  new  `general  purpose' 
technology requires the development and coordination of a vast array of complementary tangible and 
intangible  elements:  new  physical  plant  and  equipment,  new  kinds  of  workforce  skills,  new 
organizational forms, new forms of legal property, new regulatory framework, new habits of mind and 






Figure 3:  A different techno-economic paradigm for each technological revolution, 
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Figure 4:  The industries and infrastructures of each technological revolution 
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∗ These traditional industries acquire a new role and a new dynamism when serving as the material and the fuel 
of the world of railways and machinery 17 
 
These are indeed the structural retardation factors common to both the older electricity-based 
techno-economic paradigm and the new ICT-based one (see David (1990) for an illuminating 
comparison between the fates of the `dynamo' and of the `computer').  
Indeed the emergence of a new techno-economic paradigm is also associated with a profound 
process of structural change. On the supply side, structural change may be captured by the 
original Schumpeterian idea of innovation as ‘creative destruction’: new varieties of goods and 
new ways of producing them displace old ones and shift the structure of the economy toward 
new  sectors  (Schumpeter  (1939)).  On  the  demand  side,  income  elasticities  vary  across 
sectors  and  channel  growth  into  those  sectors  for  which  demand  turns  out  to  be  higher 
(Pasinetti (1981)). Overall, economies enjoy a ’structural bonus’ when labor shifts to sectors 
with higher than average productivity (Baumol (1967)). 
Note  that  structural  change  fundamentally  relies  on  an  uneven  distribution  of  productivity 
increases across industries. This corresponds to what Harberger (1998) calls the ‘mushroom’ 
view  of  growth  (in  contrast, a  ‘yeast’  process,  with  productivity  increases uniformly  spread 
across sectors, would not sustain any real process of structural change).  
As  recently  emphasized  by  Perez  (2002),  in  the  process  of  establishment  of  new  techno-
economic paradigms, sheer technological factors are deeply intertwined with social ones: 
 
``Each  technological  revolution,  originally  received  as  a  bright  new  set  of  opportunities,  is  soon 
recognized as a threat to the established way of doing things in firms, institutions and society at large. 
The new techno-economic paradigm gradually takes place as a different 'common sense' for effective 
action in any area of endeavour. But while competitive forces, profit seeking and survival pressures 
help diffuse the changes in the economy, the wider social and institutional spheres where change is 
also needed are held back by strong inertia stemming from routine, ideology and vested interests. 
[...]  
It is thus that the first 20 or 30 years of diffusion of each technological revolution lead to an increasing 
mismatch between the economy and the social and regulatory systems." (Perez (2002), p.26) 
 
The well-known claim by Robert Solow about seeing computers everywhere but in productivity 
statistics  (Solow  (1987))  captured  the  amazement  of  economists  for  not  being  able  to 
immediately observe the gains from a new technological revolution. In fact, if one takes into 
account  the  existence  of  powerful  retardation  factors,  then  the  paradox  is  not  a  paradox 
anymore. The way productivity gains diffuse across industries is a painstaking process that 
needs adaptation of economic activities to the new paradigm. If the interpretation of David 
(2001) is correct, we are only starting to observe the real gains from the current ICT-based 
techno-economic paradigm. We will discuss this point again when we turn to the empirical 
evidence of the impact of ICT on productivity growth. 
To further illustrate the point on retardation factors, let us briefly discuss a revealing example 
that we analyze at greater length in another work (Castaldi, Cimoli, Correa and Dosi (2004)). 
E-commerce and e-business represent new forms of trade which have yet to emerge as major 
transaction  channels.  The  (relatively)  low  diffusion  of  e-business  is  associated  with  two 
fundamental bottlenecks, namely: 
 
1.  the  lack  of  a  thorough  regulatory  embeddedness  of  such  transactions  (e.g.  in  terms  of 
enforcement  of  contracts)  that  affects  reputation  mechanisms  (i.e.,  ultimately,  institutional 
retardation factors); 
2. the need for reliable `coding technologies' which guarantee that on line transactions are 
safe and data are protected (i.e., sheer technological barriers). 
 
New  forms  of  trade  such  as  the  ones  implied  by  e-commerce  and  e-finance  bring  in  the 
forefront delicate institutional issues related to the `integrity' of the new markets. With the new 
technologies it becomes more difficult, for example, to check the identity of economic agents 
and  to  sanction  deviant  behaviours.  The  existing  institutions  that  provide  the  `regulatory 18 
embeddedness' for ``old" transactions are no longer sufficient to guarantee the new forms of 
trade.  In  particular  new  arrangements  are  needed  to  ensure  integrity  and  enforcement  of 
contracts. Here as well as in other historical occurrences of new forms of trading demands the 
development  of  new  institutional  mechanisms  aimed  at  providing  trading  processes  within 
some  governing  institutions.  A  very  old  example  with  bearings  on  contemporary  issues  is 
discussed  in  Milgrom,  North  and  Weingast  (1990),  concerning  the  emergence  of  the  Law 
Merchant System protecting Medieval fairs. Such institutional system was able to ensure the 
effectiveness of reputation mechanisms even when the trade arena enlarged beyond a critical 
level whereby traders were not meeting the same trading partners on a regular basis. The new 
institution  succeeded  in  creating  incentives  for  merchants  both  to  behave  honestly  and  to 
sanction deviant behavior by others. And this was achieved crucially using less information 
than would have been needed to distribute perfect information for all agents in the system, a 
condition way too costly to fulfil. There is a lesson here for the ``new economy" in its needs to 
develop  reputation  mechanisms,  forms  of  community  identification  and  tools  for  contract 
enforcement. Take this example just as suggestive illustration of more general co-evolutionary 
requirements  linking  the  diffusion  of  new  technological  paradigms  and  the  painstaking 
developments of new institutional arrangements governing microeconomic interactions. 
 
Co-evolutionary requirements concern also the mutual adaptation of new technologies and 
corporate organizational forms crucially affecting the impact of ICT. As evidence that most 
recent  efforts  aimed  at  understanding  the  role  of  ICT  in  the  economic  growth  are 
acknowledging these co-evolutionary requirements, the contributions in Mansell et al (2007) 
offer a wide spectrum of studies where institutional and organizational changes are examples 
of complementary changes that need to accompany the technological advances in ICT. As a 
powerful example, recent micro-studies present a picture where productivity gains from ICT at 
the firm level are closely inter-related with the ability of firms to implement complementary 
organizational changes. Our review of the evidence on the impact of ICT shall start precisely 
from these studies. 
 
5 The empirical evidence on the impact of ICT 
 
In this section we turn to the evidence collected so far on the economic impact of ICT. The aim 
of both micro-, meso- and macro-studies has been to investigate the causal link between ICT 
and productivity growth. It is not our purpose here to review the ongoing discussion about the 
measurement of ICT and its contribution to productivity growth (for a recent account, see van 
Ark  (2002)),  but  we  should  mention  that  measurement  remains  a  problematic  issue.  In 
particular  productivity  growth  measures  are  sensitive  to  the  methods  used  to  account  for 
decline in prices and quality changes, but also to the definition of ICT used. Also note that 
most  studies  rely  on  US  or  European  data.  In  this  section  we  will  focus  more  on  the 
implications  of  the  available  stylized  facts  for  our  evolutionary  interpretation.  We  start  by 
discussing  the  evidence found  at  the  level  of firms  and  we  then  move  to more  aggregate 
studies. 
 
5.1 The micro-evidence 
 
A  recent  literature  has  started  to  use  micro-data  in  order  to  illuminate  the  impact  of  ICT 
technologies at the firm or even at the worker level. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) review the two 
main strands of these micro-studies. 
First, a case-based literature provides evidence that the impact of ICT at the firm level goes 
together with changes in organizational practices, such as changes in authority relationships, 
decentralization of the local decision, shifts in task content and/or changes in reward schemes. 
Many of these studies (for instance Brynjolfsson, Reinshaw, and van Alstyne (1997)) show that 19 
in the face of changes in organizational practice, many workers still remain trapped in old work 
practices. Inertial forces are at work, which explain the inability of firms to instantaneously 
exploit the potential of new technologies. 
Second, an econometric literature has also emerged, using large scale data recently becoming 
available from official sources. Pilat (2004) provides an overview of these studies, available 
now for many countries. Let us briefly summarize the main results: 
 
1. Most of them find a positive relation between level of ICT and firm productivity. (Note that 
this is a correlation, more work needs to be done in understanding causality linkages). 
 
2. The evidence points at different factors moderating the impact of ICT at firm level, including 
the co-occurrence of matching skills of the workforce, appropriate organizational practice and 
other  forms  of  technological  innovation.  Moreover,  the  size  and  age  of  the  firm  seem  to 
influence the effect of ICT adoption upon productivity. 
 
3. While improvements in IT technology tend to be quickly available throughout the economy, 
the complementary organizational changes at the firm level rely on a process of 'co-invention' 
by individual firms (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1997) suggesting co-evolutionary processes 
combining  1)  the  adoption  of  information  technology,  2)  complementary  organizational 
changes,  and  3)  innovation  in  the  form  of  new  products  and  services,  (Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)). Conversely there is some evidence that the sheer adoption of 
ICT without corresponding changes in organizational practices might be simply detrimental for 
the  company.  It  is  the  combination  of  the  three  changes  mentioned  above  that  can  drive 
productivity gains. 
 
4. Some econometric works (cf. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) for US and Greenan, Mairesse 
and Topiol-Bensaid (2001) for France) have used fixed effects models to estimate the impact 
of ICT on productivity in order to capture firm-specific determinants. The estimates controlling 
for fixed effects are substantially lower and indicate that much of the ability of firms to exploit 
gains from ICT relates to intrinsic organizational somewhat pre-existent capabilities.  
 
Bartelsman  and  Doms  (2000)  also  discuss  insights  coming  from  micro  studies  on  the 
relationship between productivity and advanced technology. Use of the latest technology turns 
out to be highly correlated with other variables (such as human capital). A study by Doms, 
Dunne and Troske (1997) shows that plants that had above average productivity because of 
ICT, also had the same before the introduction of ICT because they consistently were the ones 
choosing the most advanced technologies. In this sense, also under an ICT-centered regime 
of  technological  change  asymmetries  across  firms  are  the  rule:  some  firms  show  a  much 
higher  performance  and  persistently  so.  In  turn,  this  can  easily  be  interpreted  as  an 

























Figure 5: The IT productivity paradox in Europe (source: Daveri (2002)) 
 
5.2 The aggregate evidence on the impact of ICT 
 
A puzzling result in the empirical literature on the impact of ICT is the fact that more aggregate 
studies do not find the foregoing positive relation between ICT and productivity often revealed 
by  micro-studies  (cf.  also  the  review  in  Draca  et  al  (2007)).  Figure  5  from  Daveri  (2002) 
illustrates  this  puzzle  for  Europe:  labor  productivity  growth  does  not  have  any  significant 
relationship with IT investment. In some ways the Solow paradox still seems to hold at a macro 
level. In this respect, further insights can be gained by using an industry-level perspective. In 
fact,  the  sectors  display  striking  variance  in  productivity  performances.  ICT  producing 
industries show strong and robust productivity gains, while the evidence is much weaker for 
ICT using industries (van Ark et al. (2002)), see also Figure 6).  21 
For the US, Oliner and Sichel (2000) identify ICT investment as the main driver of the recent 
productivity revival.
5 
Note also that, most of the productivity gap between the United States and Europe can in fact 
be attributed to ICT using industries (van Ark et al. (2002)). Indeed it might well be that the 
appearance of a `Solow paradox' in Europe might be especially due to a slower diffusion of 
ICT in ICT using sectors like wholesale trade and security trading. In any case, these are the 
sectors  which  make  the  essential  difference  between  the  US  and  Europe  in  terms  of 
productivity differentials. 
To summarize, industry-level studies strongly point at the uneven inter-sectoral diffusion of 
ICT-based technologies and their equally uneven impact upon productivity growth. 
Given the foregoing features of the new ICT-based regime and the evidence on its impact on 
productivity growth, how has this new cluster of technologies influenced the international 
patterns of innovation, innovation diffusion and growth? 
 
Figure 6:  Productivity growth and GDP shares of ICT using and non-ICT industries in 
the EU and the US (source: van Ark et al. (2002)). 
 
 
    Productivity growth    GDP share 
  1990-1995    1995-2000    2000 
  EU
6  US    EU
a  US    EU
a  US 
                 
Total Economy  1.9  1.1    1.4  2.5    100.0  100.0 
  ICT Producing Industries  6.7  8.1    8.7  10.1    5.9  7.3 
    ICT Producing Manufacturing  11.1  15.1    13.8  23.7    1.6  2.6 
    ICT Producing Services  4.4  3.1    6.5  1.8    4.3  4.7 
  ICT Using Industries
7  1.7  1.5    1.6  4.7    27.0  30.6 
    ICT Using Manufacturing  3.1  -0.3    2.1  1.2    5.9  4.3 
    ICT Using Services  1.1  1.9    1.4  5.4    21.1  26.3 
  Non-ICT Industries  1.6  0.2    0.7  0.5    67.1  62.1 
    Non-ICT Manufacturing  3.8  3.0    1.5  1.4    11.9  9.3 
    Non-ICT Services  0.6  -0.4    0.2  0.4    44.7  43.0 
    Non-ICT Other  2.7  0.7    1.9  0.6    10.5  9.8 
                 
Pro memoria: with national deflators                 
Total Economy  1.9  1.1    1.4  2.5       
  ICT Producing Manufacturing  7.8  15.1    10.1  23.7       
                 
                 
                 
Source: van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2002, 2003a) 
                                                 
5  However  their  results  have  been  questioned  by  Gordon  (2003),  who  argues  that  their  growth  accounting 
methodology actually over-estimates the contribution of ICT investment.  
First, their methodology assumes that productivity gains from ICT capital happen instantaneously. But retardation 
factors imply a necessary time lag for economic actors to enjoy the benefits of a new technology.  
Second, most of the aggregate productivity growth is given by the productivity revival in the retail sector, but there 
is evidence that the latter can in fact be fully explained by non-ICT related factors. A study by Foster et al (2002) 
has convincingly shown that the productivity revival in the retail sector can be attributed solely to the displacement 
of less productive establishments with more productive ones. 
6 EU includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain,  Sweden and the United Kingdom, which 
represent over 90% of EU GDP.  Notes: Productivity is defined as value added per person employed 
7 excluding ICT producine 
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6  The  contemporary  processes  of  generation  and  diffusion  of 




One  has  already  mentioned  the  continuing  concentration  of  innovative  activities, 
notwithstanding  remarkable  new  entrants  such  as  Finland,  Korea,  Taiwan  and  to  a  lower 
extent Brazil and India.  Not surprisingly, such patterns in innovative outputs are matched by 
persistent international differences in the share of resources devoted to formal technological 
learning (also revealed by privately financed R&D). So, while Korea has overtaken quite a 
while ago ``developed " countries like Italy, most LDCs continue to display negligible levels of 





Figure  7:  Intensity  of  firm  level  R&D.  Source:  own  elaborations  on  data  from  Main 
















































































































































































































































































































Certainly, ICT technologies have determined easier diffusion of information. However, there is 
hardly any evidence of a generalized acceleration in the rates of adoption of both ``new" (e.g. 
ICT-related) and ``old" technologies (from telephones to tractors). Let us begin with the latter. 
Even in this case there is hardly any evidence of generalized patterns of convergence in their 
use at world level: see Figure 8. 
At the same time levels of education and number of graduates remain very different across 
countries, accounting in some cases for rather low levels of human capital (see the evidence in 
Tables  7  and  8):  in  turn,  other  things  being  equal,  uneven  educational  attainments  imply 
deeply uneven national absorptive capacities for new technologies. 
 
As  for  new  technologies,  diffusion  of  the  new  ICT  technologies  is  occurring  in  highly 
asymmetric fashions across countries. This applies to OECD countries and, even more so, to 
the universe of countries in the world economy. Most of the data available refer to developed 
countries. But, if gaps are found for those economies, even larger gaps are to be expected for 
developing ones. 
It is useful to start by distinguishing the relative impact on production and consumption. 
As for production, there has been an increasing investment in ICT capital for the last 30 years 
and a rising factory automation, all the way from mechanical engineering to continuous cycle 
processes. At the same time, the evidence reinforces the view – discussed above – that we 
are  still  in  an  initial  phase  of  the  diffusion  of  ICT  technologies,  certainly  with  a  consistent 
unexpressed potential. And. again, this applies even more so to developing countries. So, 
even in the United States ICT investment represents less than 30% of total investment and the 
share reduces considerably for European countries (see Daveri (2002)).  
Relatedly, the degree of automation in production has greatly increased, but one is still very far 
from saturating levels. As an illustrative example, Table 9 provides the number of robotic units 
and mechanical arms installed for a sample of countries. After some normalization via national 
value  added  in  manufacturing,  one  gets  an  estimate  of  the  relative  rates  of  diffusion  of 
robotics. Japan is the leader, followed by the European countries and Korea, and finally by the 
US, at great distance. 24 
 
 
Table 7: Number of researchers (per thousand labour force). 
  1991  1994  1997  2000  2003 
           
EU15  4.4  4.75  5  5.5  5.9 
Finland  5.5  6.4  10.6  13.4  15.9 
France  5.2  5.9  6  6.5  7.1 
Germany  6.1  5.95  5.9  6.5  6.8 
Ireland  3.8  3.7  4.6  4.9  5.4 
Italy  3.1  3.3  2.8  2.8  3 
Sweden  5.8  7.2  8.4  9.7  10.6 
UK  4.4  4.8  5.2     
US  7.6  7.7  8.4  9  9.1 
Japan  7.5  8.1  9.2  9.6  10.1 
Argentina  0.97  0.75  0.5  1.7  1.5 
Brazil  1.92  1.7       
Chile  1.17  1.17  1.19  1.3   
Mexico  2.28  1.48  0.6  0.6   
Venezuela  1.75  1.82  2.13     
Singapore    3.9  5.2  7.6  9.3 
Taiwan      5  5.7  6.7 
South Korea      4.7  4.9  6.6 
China  0.7  0.8  0.8  1  1.1 
 
Source: Own elaborations on Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD (2005b).  
Data for Latin America are from Ricyt (2000) 25 
 
Table 8: Mean years of schooling. 
    1970  1980  1990  2000 
OECD  Australia  10.2  10.3  10.4  10.9 
  Austria  7.4  7.3  7.8  8.4 
  Belgium  8.8  8.2  8.9  9.3 
  Canada  9.1  10.3  11.0  11.6 
  Denmark  8.8  9.0  9.6  9.7 
  Finland  6.1  7.2  9.4  10.0 
  France  5.7  6.7  7.0  7.9 
  Germany      9.9  10.2 
  Ireland  6.8  7.5  8.8  9.4 
  Italy  5.5  5.9  6.5  7.2 
  Japan  7.5  8.5  9.0  9.5 
  Netherlands  7.8  8.2  8.8  9.4 
  New Zealand  9.7  11.5  11.3  11.7 
  Norway  7.2  8.2  11.6  11.9 
  Portugal  2.6  3.8  4.9  5.9 
  Spain  4.8  6.0  6.4  7.3 
  Sweden  8.0  9.7  9.5  11.4 
  Switzerland  8.5  10.4  10.1  10.5 
  UK  7.7  8.3  8.8  9.4 
  US  9.5  11.9  11.7  12.0 
           
NICs  Israel  8.1  9.4  9.4  9.6 
  Singapore  5.1  5.5  6.0  7.1 
  South Korea  4.9  7.9  9.9  10.8 
  Hong Kong  6.3  8.0  9.2  9.4 
         
Latin America     Argentina  6.2  7.0  8.1  8.8 
  Brazil  3.3  3.1  4.0  4.9 
  Chile  5.7  6.4  7.0  7.6 
  Mexico  3.7  4.8  6.7  7.2 
  Venezuela  3.2  5.5  5.0  6.6 
           
  India  2.3  3.3  4.1  5.1 
  China    4.8  5.9  6.4 
           
World  Mean  4.2  4.9  5.8  6.4 
  Coeff. of variation  1.6  1.8  2.0  2.3 




A complementary but different picture comes out from data on expenditure for Information 
Technology which can be taken as a proxy for the overall automation of the economy. The 
percentages  remain  quite  small  in  size  (Table  10).  Moreover  the  comparison  of  the  two 
previous tables uncovers the puzzling position of the United States. The evidence indicates 
that Japan and Europe lag behind the US in terms of total automation (as proxied by the level 
of ICT investment), while on the contrary the US lag behind in terms of factory automation (the 
same circumstantial evidence was already pointed out in Arcangeli, Dosi and Moggi (1991), 
see also Freeman (2001) for a discussion of the US national innovation system). 
As for consumption, the evidence again points to a diffusion of new technologies that is highly 
uneven across countries, even within the OECD. Table 11 reports on the strength of the IT 
infrastructure in a sample of countries. The ranking of countries now changes. US is far ahead 
in the `informatization' of its society and the other developed countries follow at considerable 
distance (the only relevant exception comes from mobile phones). Note also, interestingly, that 
there is also evidence of a ‘digital divide’ within the United States (Greenstein and Prince 
(2007)), with non-urban areas lagging behind in terms of high-speed Internet connection as the 




Table 9: Number of robotic units and mechanical arms installed, 2000. 
 
Country  Number of units  Ratio to Industry 
    Value Added 
     
Japan  389.000  378 
Germany  91.184  139 
US  89.880  37 
Italy  47.621  113 
Korea  37.987  122 
Source:  Own  elaborations  on  data  from 
UCIMU (2001) and OECD. 
 
Table  11  adds  further  evidence  on  the  uneven  diffusion  of  ICT  technologies.  Note  the 
impressive international differences in the diffusion of ICT technologies: compare for example 
Finland with Poland or East Asia with Latin America. 
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7 ΕΟΗ      ,7 Η[ΣΗΘΓΛ ΞΥΗ 
 ,ΘΙΡΥΠ  ΛΡΘ 7ΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑ∴  Η[ΦΟΞΓΛΘϑ 
&ΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ  ΛΡΘ    ς   ΣΗΥΦΗΘ  ϑΗ ΡΙ 
∗∋3 
 
Country  1992  1996  2001 
US  4.45  4.93  5.30 
Japan  3.83  3.60  4.00 
EU15  3.03  3.17  4.17 
Sweden  4.37  4.73  6.77 
UK  4.43  4.9  5.62 
Netherlands  3.96  3.84  5.19 
Denmark  3.94  4.1  4.99 
France  3.59  3.74  4.75 
Belgium  3.38  3.34  4.48 
Finland  2.93  3.36  4.38 
Germany  2.94  2.96  4.22 
Austria  2.73  2.8  3.78 
Norway  3.24  3.26  3.66 
Italy  1.8  1.78  2.48 
Ireland  2.35  2.18  2.25 
Spain  1.62  1.56  1.94 
Portugal  1.24  1.48  1.93 
Greece  0.71  0.90  1.20 
Source: Elaborations of Eurostat data28 
7 ΕΟΗ     ,ΘΓΗ[Ης ΡΙ ,&7 ΓΛΙΙΞςΛΡΘ  ΣΗΥ     ΣΡΣΞΟ  ΛΡΘ  
    Telephone lines and 
cellular subscribers  Internet users 
Personal 
computers 
    1990  1998  2003  1990  1998  2003  1990  1998  2003 
OECD  Austria  42.9  78.9  136.0  0.1  15.4  46.2  6.5  23.8  37.4 
  Australia  46.7  77.2  126.2  0.6  22.4  56.7  15.0  36.8  60.2 
  Belgium  39.7  66.7  128.2  0.0  7.8  38.6  8.8  21.5  31.8 
  Canada  58.7  84.2  107.0  0.4  25.6  48.4  10.7  32.1  48.7 
  Denmark  59.6  102.4  155.3  0.1  22.6  54.1  11.5  37.7  57.7 
  Finland  58.6  110.2  140.2  0.21  25.4  53.4  10.0  34.9  44.2 
  France  50.0  77.6  126.2  0.1  6.3  36.6  7.1  23.2  34.7 
  Germany  44.5  73.7  144.3  0.1  9.9  47.3  9.0  27.9  48.5 
  Ireland  28.8  69.6  137.1  0.0  8.1  31.7  8.6  27.3  42.1 
  Italy  39.2  81.0  150.2  0.0  4.5  33.7  3.6  13.3  23.1 
  Japan  44.8  86.8  115.1  0.0  13.4  48.3  6.0  23.7  38.2 
  Netherlands  47.0  80.5  138.2  0.3  22.2  52.2  9.4  32.4  46.7 
  Norway  54.8  113.4  162.2  0.7  36.0  34.6  12.1  40.5  52.8 
  Spain  31.7  57.7  134.5  0.0  4.4  23.9  2.8  10.9  19.6 
  Sweden  73.5  118.6  162.5  0.6  33.4  57.3  10.5  39.5  62.1 
  UK  46.0  80.5  143.1  0.1  13.5  42.3  10.8  26.8  40.6 
  US  56.9  90.7  117.0  0.8  30.8  55.6  21.8  45.2  66.0 
  Russian Fed.  13.99  20.36  50.2  0  0.81  4.09  0.34  3.46  8.87 
  Hungary  9.62  44.09  111.74  0  3.92  23.22  0.96  6.48  10.84 
  Poland  8.64  27.74  76.96  0  4.08  23.24  0.79  4.91  14.2 
                      Latin America  Argentina  9.3  28.1  39.6  0.0  0.9  11.2  0.7  5.5  8.2 
  Brazil  6.5  16.5  48.7  0.0  1.5  8.2  0.3  3.0  7.5 
  Chile  6.7  27.1  73.2  0.0  1.7  27.2  0.9  6.3  11.9 
  Colombia  6.9  20.0  32.1  0.0  1.1  5.3    3.2  4.9 
  Mexico  6.6  13.9  45.4  0.0  1.3  12.0  0.8  3.7  8.3 
  Peru  2.6  9.3  17.3  0.0  1.2  10.4    3.0  4.3 
  Venezuela  7.7  19.8  38.4  0.0  1.4  6.0  1.0  3.9  6.1 
                      NICs  Israel  34.6  82.8  141.9  0.1  10.0  30.1  6.3  20.1  24.3 
  Hong Kong  47.5  105.5  163.8  0.0  14.5  47.2  4.7  26.0  42.2 
  Singapore  36.3  73.2  130.3  0.0  19.1  50.9  6.6  37.0  62.2 
  Korea  30.8  75.1  123.9  0.0  6.8  61.0  3.7  18.2  55.8 
                        India  0.6  2.3  7.1  0.0  0.1  1.8  0.0  0.3  0.7 
  China  0.6  8.9  42.4  0.0  0.2  6.3  0.0  0.9  2.8 
                     
World  Average  14.9  28.2  46.7  0.0  3.7  13.1  3.4  8.0  12.8 
  Coeff Variation  1.2  1.1  1.0  4.6  1.9  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.3 





At the same time communication costs still remain a barrier to ICT use in a number of OECD 
countries (see Fig. 9). 
 
 
)ΛϑΞΥΗ    7ΚΗ ΦΡς ς ΡΙ ΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ  ΛΡΘ ΛΘ 2(&∋ ΦΡΞΘ ΥΛΗς  ΣΥΛΦΗ Ε ςΝΗ  ΙΡΥ 





The most recent evidence about the participation of developing countries to the ICT-based regime 
shows that East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Philippines and Korea have the highest share 
of employment and value added of the ICT sector (both manufacturing and services). Korea has in 
fact  stopped  since  a  couple  of  decades  to  be  a  developing  country  and  has  joined  the  quite 
exclusive  club  of  innovators.  Conversely,  most  Latin  American  countries  and  a  few  Eastern 
European ones remain at the bottom of the list (UNCTAD (2006), Chart 1.15).  
The OECD Information Technology Outlook 2006 reports the geographical distribution of the top 
250 ICT firms. While 116 of these are US firms, followed by 39 Japanese firms, the newcomers 
are also represented (11 for Taiwan, 6 for Korea, 3 for Hong Kong and for India). Mexico is the 
only Latin American country included (with 2 top ICT firms).  
 
Another strong trend of the last 10 years has been the increasing outsourcing of activities by 
manufacturing  firms  in  developed  economies.  The  very  properties  of  ICT  technologies  have 
enabled the dislocation of non-core activities and services to other regions of the world (cf. Miozzo 
and Soete (2001)). Within this trend, a number of countries have been able to reap the benefits of 
attracting  foreign  firms  to  their  sites  or  simply  directly  exporting  services.  In  fact,  developing 
economies are playing an increasingly large role in ICT-enabled services, with success stories 
including Singapore for financial services and India for software. As discussed by Cantwell and 
Janne  (1999),  the  recent  emergence  of  more  global  chains  of  production  has  made  it  more 
important for firms to take strategic decisions not only on which activities to outsource abroad but 
also on which countries to select as host countries. In this respect the availability of cheap labour 
is attractive for foreign firms only if it is accompanied by good local infrastructures, high quality 
labour and, also, tax advantages.  
 
At  the  same  time,  the  internationalization  of  innovative  activities  by  MNCs  beyond  the  home 
countries  has  somewhat  increased,  but  one  is  still  talking  about  rather  low  proportions.  Most 
studies indicate that patenting by MNCs originating in countries different from that of their own 
origin is of the order of 10-15% of their total patenting, roughly comparable to their share in the 
total  patenting  of  the guest  countries.  Moreover,  most  of  these foreign  search  activities  occur 
within OECD countries (for discussion of the evidence cf. Patel and Pavitt (1997) and (1999), 
Cantwell (1992) and Archibugi and Pietrobelli (2003)). 30 
 
In terms of outsourcing of R&D activities, multinational companies have been much more reluctant 
to transfer key research labs to developing countries. One of the reasons for firms to decentralize 
R&D activities is to relocate in the neighbourhood of technological centers of excellence in order to 
enjoy  agglomeration  economies  and  spillovers  of  new  knowledge  concentrating  in  that  area 
(Dunning, 1993). But most key geographical technological clusters are still found in the developed 
world.  As  shown  in  Table  12,  the  great  majority  of  R&D  foreign  affiliates  are  still  located  in 
developed countries and only about 10% in developing countries, of which 8% in Asian countries. 
Note that, also in this case, the growth figures may be impressive but the levels are not. 
There is also evidence that until recently R&D facilities located abroad were mostly responsible for 
adapting existing products to local needs and tastes, while most fundamental and strategic R&D 
efforts were maintained in-house in the home countries (Pearce (1989)). ‘Support laboratories’ (in 
the  definition  of  Pearce  (1999))  are  simply  responsible  for  short-term  technology  transfer  and 
facilitate  the  assimilation  of  the  technologies  for  local  affiliates.  Long  term  goals  may  only  be 
achieved if multinationals move from ‘support laboratories’ to ‘locally integrated laboratories’ and 
even ‘international independent laboratories’.  
 
 
Table 12: Geographical distribution of R&D foreign affiliates, 2004 
 
Region/economy    Number 
Total world    2584 
Developed countries  2185 
of which  Western Europe  1387 
  United States  552 
  Japan  29 
Developing countries  264 
of which  Africa  4 
  Latin America and the Caribbean  40 
  Asia  216 
  South, East and South East Asia  207 
     
Source: UNCTAD, based on the Who Owns Whom database of Dun and Bradstreet. 
The data are based on a sample of 2284 majority-owned foreign affiliates identified in the db as 
engaged in either: 
- commercial, physical and educational research (SIC code 8731) 
- commercial economics and biological research (SIC code 8732) 
- non-commercial research (SIC code 8733)   
- testing laboratories (SIC code 8734)   31 
 
7 Some concluding remarks and policy implications 
 
We  have  led  the  reader  through  a  long  tour  building  on  an  evolutionary 
interpretation of the patterns of technological change and their (close) links with 
economic development. The modes and timing of such coupled dynamics, we 
have  argued,  is  deeply  influenced  by  the  (relatively  rare)  emergence  of  new 
techno-economic  paradigms  or  regimes,  driven  by  constellations  of 
complementary, thoroughly pervasive, micro technological paradigms (which in 
the mostly US-originated literature subsequent to Freeman and Perez (1988) and 
related contributions have become known under the heading of “general purpose 
technologies”, cf. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995)). 
ICT-based  technologies  are  the  drivers  of  one  of  such  changes  in  techno-
economic regimes, which we suggested, is still just at an early stage of diffusion 
in general, and in particular with respect to developing countries. In that, the new 
techno-economic  paradigm  represents  both  an  opportunity  and  a  threat  for 
developing countries. It is certainly the case that the pervasiveness of the new 
technologies  makes  their  adoption  a  developmental  necessity,  independently 
from the precise patterns of `comparative advantage'. Even more strongly, from 
an  historical  perspective,  countries  that  have  successfully  overtaken 
technological  leaders  have  done  so  by  mastering  the  technology  behind  the 
dominant  techno-economic  paradigm  (see  also  the  discussion  in  Freeman 
(1995)). That has been the case for Britain and the steam engine, Germany and 
the  US  for  chemicals  and  Fordist  mass  production,  Japan  and  Korea  for 
electronics  and  most  recently  China  and  India  for  ICT-based  products  and 
services. Thus, catch-up of technological followers crucially depends on getting 
to  the  frontier  of  technological  advances  of  the  dominant  techno-economic 
paradigm. 
 
Given this, we would like to offer a few thoughts about a possible ICT-based 
development path.  
First,  the  availability  of  natural  resources  and  its  utilization  is  an  issue  totally 
uncorrelated with the necessity of long-term ICT diffusion. Natural advantages 
have never been a sufficient reason for a country or region to catch-up. Instead, 
created  advantages  have  been  the  source  of  sustained  advantages  (see 
Freeman (2002) for an historical perspective). 
Second, catching-up in ICT investment is crucial for developing countries to build 
their `national absorptive capacity', also for foreign-generated knowledge (Bell 
and Pavitt (1993)). While late-comers have the potential to achieve the highest 
growth  rates,  the  potential  may  be  realized  only  if  local  firms  are  able  to 
recognize,  exploit  and  internalize  the  knowledge  underlying  the  new 
technologies. ICT infrastructures play a crucial role in the latter process.  
Third, developing countries need to nurture their corporate organizations that are 
able to exploit the opportunities associated with ICT. The role of such type of 
governmental policies for catch-up in general has been stressed already in the 
work of institutional economists like Amsden (1989). 32 
 
The evidence persuasively shows that the current ICT-based techno-economic 
regime is emerging under the `political economy’ of globalization of international 
economic exchanges, but not of globalization of technological capabilities so far. 
At the same time a globalized world is one in which local and national systems of 
innovation  come  to  play  an  even  greater  role.  As  Freeman  (1995)  puts  it:  `` 
national  and  regional  systems  of  innovation  remain  an  essential  domain  of 
economic analysis. Their importance derives from the networks of relationships 
which  are  necessary  for  any  firm  to  innovate.  Whilst  external  international 
connections are  certainly  of  growing importance,  the  influence  of  the  national 
education  system,  industrial  relations,  technical  and  scientific  institutions, 
government  policies,  cultural  traditions  and  many  other  national  institutions  is 
fundamental.”(op. cit. p. 5) This is also the point made by Porter (1990) in its 
work on the competitive advantage of nations. 
More  in  general,  while  there  seem  to  be  no  invariant  recipes  for  successful 
economic growth, yet one can identify some fundamental policy ingredients and 
processes  derived  from  the  past,  but  valid  for  the  future  as  well  (see  for  a 
broader discussion Dosi, Freeman and Fabiani (1994) and Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson 
and Stiglitz (2006)). 
 
First,  policies  aimed  at  increasing  the  opportunities  for  scientific  and 
technological innovation have mostly started by ensuring a rapid expansion of 
the number of qualified engineers and in general strive to strengthen graduate 
education (see for instance the evidence in Lazonick (2007)). Broader education 
and  training  policies  also  help  to  build  socially  distributed  learning  and 
technological capabilities. Together with a strengthened education system, the 
development of technical and scientific institutions, increasingly networked with 
the  private  sector  also  plays  a  key  role.  The  ‘congruence’  between  science, 
technology,  culture  and  entrepreneurships  as  ‘sub-systems’  within  national 
innovation systems has also been emphasized (Freeman (2002)). 
 
Second, most success stories also show rather sophisticated policy efforts aimed 
at  fostering  technological  learning  and  at  penalizing  rent-seeking  behaviours 
even  under  regimes  of  partial  protection  of  the  domestic  market:  incentive 
alignment measures favouring export-oriented strategies is a major case to the 
point. In general, targeted industrial support measures, for instance affecting the 
ownership structure of firms or targeting `national champions', prove to be quite 
effective tools for boosting technological activities at the firm level. These have to 
be combined with carefully chosen selection mechanisms affecting competition, 
entry and bankruptcy, price regulations and allocation of finance. As a general 
trade-off, nurturing capability-building has to be matched by mechanisms stifling 
inertia and rent-seeking. 
 
Third, the patterns of information distributions and interaction across economic 
actors  have  also  been subject  to  policy  intervention. One has observed  quite 
diverse  `political  economies'  and  `social  pacts',  displaying  nonetheless  some 33 
common features of generalized consensus building. In the case of the Far East 
these  measures  were  apparently  based  on  a  variety  of  combinations  among 
authoritarian politics, corporate paternalism and the ability to widely distribute the 
benefits from fast growth. 
 
Fourth, at the firm level effective ingredients for productivity growth have been 
high rates of physical and intangible investment and the progressive integration 
of production design, marketing and research activities. 
 
Fifth,  in  terms  of  international  specialization  patterns,  success  stories  have 
shown a commodity composition of production and trade increasingly centred on 
technologies  and  products  featuring  high  innovative  opportunities  and  high 
income elasticities.  
 
The historical experience shows a great variety of country- and sector specific 
combinations between the foregoing types of policies, highlighting also the subtle 
tradeoffs  that  we  have  discussed  above.  The  comparison  between  the 
experience of Far Eastern countries and Latin American ones is a particularly 
revealing one. In a nutshell, Korea -as well as other far eastern economies - has 
been  able  to  `twist  around'  absolute  and  relative  prices  and  channel  the 
resources  stemming  from  `static'  comparative  advantages  toward  the 
development  of  activities  characterized  by  higher  learning  opportunities  and 
demand elasticities (Amsden (1989)). And they did that in ways which penalized 
rent-seeking behaviours by private firms. In fact the major actors in technological 
learning have been large business groups - the chaebols- which were able at a 
very  early  stage  of  development  to  internalize  skills  for  the  selection  of 
technologies acquired from abroad, their efficient use and their adaptation and, 
not  much  later,  were  able  to  grow  impressive  engineering  capabilities  (Kim 
(1993)).  
 
This process has been further supported by a set of institutions and networks for 
improving human resources. All this sharply contrasts with the Latin American 
experience, where the arrangement between the State and the private sector has 
often been more indulgent over inefficiencies and rent-accumulation, and less 
attentive to the accumulation of socially diffused technological capabilities and 
skills. Thus, ultimately success or failure appears to depend on the combinations 
of  different  institutional  arrangements  and  policies,  in  so  far  as  they  affect 
learning  processes  by  individuals  and  organizations,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
selection processes, including of course market competition, on the other. 
A  similar  reasoning  applies  to  the  opportunities  and  threats  offered  by  ICT 
technologies. Policy making will need to carefully balance these trade-offs and 
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